Influencia social y sostenibilidad en el uso de recursos renovables

Isabel Almudi; Julio Sánchez-Chóliz

doi:10.7201/earn.2006.11.02

Authors

Isabel Almudi Universidad de Zaragoza
Julio Sánchez-Chóliz Universidad de Zaragoza

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7201/earn.2006.11.02

Keywords:

Renewable Resources, Sustainability, Environmental Information, Overuse

Abstract

In this paper we present a model in which we show that if the withdrawal activities referring to a renewable resource are abusive, they generate a social reaction of some kind that changes the social preferences. This change is taken into account by the social planner in deciding the optimal allocation between consumption and stock of the resource. Given these new conditions we ask how the stock of the resource in the steady state changes and what can be deduced about the chance of overuse of the resource. At the same time we compare these results to the ones obtained with traditional models which did not take social reactions into account. The conclusions obtained show that with these new conditions the stock of the steady state increases and the economy behavior becomes more conservative, diminishing the chance of overuse of the resource.

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Author Biographies

Isabel Almudi, Universidad de Zaragoza

Dep. de Análisis Económico

Julio Sánchez-Chóliz, Universidad de Zaragoza

Dep. de Análisis Económico

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