The Main Contributions to the Theory of Environmental Regulation: The Last Forty Years

Montserrat Viladrich Grau

Abstract

In this article I present the main contributions to the theory of environmental regulation developed during the last forty years. I begin the analysis in the sixties and seventies reviewing the main articles of these years, focusing in the comparison of the properties of the instruments based on economic incentives and of the instruments based on quantities. Next I evaluate the policy developments of the eighties, centering my attention on the generalization of the systems of marketable permits. Finally, I analyze how in the nineties the main interest of environmental regulation is oriented towards the solution of global environmental problems.

Keywords

Environmental regulation instruments

Subject classification

Q58, Q50.

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References

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