Credence attributes standards and certification. A comparison of vegetable standards

Raúl Compés López

Abstract

European consumers are demanding more trust attributes for the safety of products and the origins or methods of the food production chain. The supply of these attributes in the optimal quantity makes it necessary and very often the participation of a third party: the government if there are externalities derived from consumption and production of these attributes, i.e. through obligatory standards, or an independent entity to certify the fulfilment of a voluntary standard. In the vegetable sector, in general, and in the fresh tomato production, in particular, the number of these obligatory norms and voluntary standards has raised considerably in the last few years. This proliferation has created a problem of information and knowledge for consumers and producers, who need to know the differences in order to decide what to do. By comparing the main voluntary standards, we see that the greatest coincidences are established in the food security chapter. Therefore, there are more demanding standards due to a greater number of fixed requirements and a higher exigency level. EUREPGAP and AENOR are the more complete standards. The first has the advantage of reducing the transaction costs between the promoting supermarkets and their vegetable suppliers and, at the same time, is becoming a barrier for selling to them.

Keywords

confidence; standard; certification; EUREPGAP; N AENOR

Subject classification

Q16, Q18.

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References

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